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Deviation: A Comparison of Dibao Regulations 
across State Levels 
 
Maja Kolmos and Christopher Rosenmeier 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Chinese government has implemented a means-tested social 
security net for the poorest known as dibao. We compare dibao 
legislation from the State Council, the Shandong provincial 
government, and the Qingdao municipal government. As a case 
study, this comparative analysis of dibao legislation across 
different state levels and time periods provides a method to 
analyse differences between central and local government levels. 
We show that local governments are able to subvert the intentions 
of the central government by adding sections and altering the 
language in key passages. This type of horizontal and vertical 
reading of multiple texts reveals priorities and differences between 
government levels in ways that are not apparent in any single text.  
 
Keywords dibao, minimum living standard, welfare policy, 
central-local relations  
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Central Government Poverty Policy and Local 
Deviation: A Comparison of Dibao Regulations 
across State Levels 
 
 
Maja Kolmos and Christopher Rosenmeier 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1990s, China has been implementing wide-scale reforms 
of the social security system. Pensions, health care, unemployment 
insurance, and poverty alleviation schemes are tested and 
implemented as the government tries to ensure broader social 
welfare coverage. Targeting the very poorest, the government has 
implemented a welfare programme known as dibao (zuidi shenghuo 
baozhang zhidu 最最最最最最最最), also called the Minimum Living 
Standard or Minimum Livelihood Guarantee. In principle, the 
programme is intended to ensure near-universal coverage, 
excluding only those without local hukou (户户) registration, such 
as migrant workers. Benefits are low and only intended to ensure a 
subsistence-level living standard. Unlike higher tier welfare 
programmes in urban areas, dibao is non-contributory, so any 
household with an income below the local threshold should be 
eligible. Poverty lines are set locally and vary enormously, but 
they are mostly set to only meet subsistence needs.  
Dibao payments take households up to this poverty line, but 
not above it. Dibao was first implemented in urban areas in urban 
areas in the late 1990s, and in recent years it has been expanding 
rapidly in the countryside as well. The expansion into rural areas 
is still a fairly recent phenomenon, and it will not be covered 
further here. This study refers to the dibao urban programme only. 
The discussion aims to analyse and compare dibao policy texts 
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from central and local government levels across time. We call this 
a horizontal and vertical reading. As a research methodology, 
comparative policy analysis is most often carried out at the 
national level. The policies of nations are compared in terms of 
cost, outcomes, and various other parameters. But China with its 
decentralized implementation of welfare policy also provides an 
interesting case for comparative analysis between government 
levels and regions. Usually government laws and regulations 
originate from the central government in Beijing and are then 
disseminated and copied with minor variations by local 
governments at provincial and lower levels. Since lower level texts 
are largely copied from the higher level document, we argue that it 
is the variations between texts that are particularly interesting.  
Regulations concerning dibao from the State Council will be 
compared with those from Shandong province and Qingdao 
青青municipality 市. Analysis of social welfare programmes, such 
as dibao, provides an interesting perspective on the relationship 
between Chinese state levels. The government has centralized the 
management of social security under the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security, but the responsibility for implementing the 
programmes is usually transferred to local governments and 
municipalities. This decentralization of social welfare provisioning 
has made local governments the main actors in accumulating 
funds, redistributing resources, and running welfare systems. This 
decentralized system can potentially create a divide between the 
intentions of the central government that designed the programme 
and the local government implementing it and paying for it. Local 
governments have different priorities and fiscal capacities. 
Qingdao was partly chosen due to the easy access to documents 
through government websites and partly due to the city making 
fairly average dibao payments as shown below.  
Central Government Poverty Policy and Local Deviation 
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Usually any tension between local and central government 
levels is relegated to private discussions between various 
government actors. This study finds that legal documents 
concerning social welfare programmes reveal some of these 
tensions as local governments alter the wordings provided from 
the State Council, even to the extent of fundamentally 
undermining their intent. More generally, this is a case study on 
how to interpret social welfare legislation, concluding that 
comparative analyses of such documents can reveal frictions 
between government levels that are not apparent in any single text. 
 
 
Programme Expansion and Limitations 
During the 1990s, a number of cities established their own dibao 
programmes. The first implementation was set up in Shanghai in 
1993 (Tang, 2003/4). The Shanghai model was based on a fixed 
monthly payment and a rations system which gave recipients 
access to subsidized goods. Funding was shared by the municipal 
government and employers. Wuhan adopted dibao in 1996 and set 
up a simpler system funded entirely by the government. Half the 
funding came from the municipal level and each district provided 
the other half. In both the Shanghai and Wuhan models people 
still capable of working or who had working family members were 
excluded, regardless of their actual level of income. In 1996, 
Chongqing implemented dibao as well, making it available to all 
registered citizens, regardless of age and working ability. The 
programme expanded quickly supported by the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (Guan and Xu, 2011). Larger cities like Xiamen, Dalian, 
Qingdao, Fuzhou and Guangzhou all implemented some sort of 
dibao programme. These experiments were used as the basis for 
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the dibao system eventually adopted by the State Council (Tang, 
2003/4).  
In 1997, the State Council issued a circular requesting all 
cities to implement dibao for urban residents by the end of 1999 
(State Council, 1997). Two years later, the State Council 
promulgated a list of regulations standardizing the 
implementation of the programme and stressing income as the 
sole criterion of eligibility (State Council, 1999). At the central level, 
Li Peng (李李) and later Zhu Rongji (朱朱朱) played major roles in 
supporting the adoption and promotion of dibao (Hammond, 
2011). After the State Council’s support of the programme in 1997, 
the adoption of dibao expanded rapidly. By the end of September 
1999, 668 cities and 1,638 county governments had implemented 
some form of dibao, but the actual number of recipients remained 
extremely low. According to J. C. B. Leung (2003), only one-third 
of the eligible poor were covered. Martin Ravallion and Shaohua 
Chen (2004) estimate the proportion at about a quarter. Many cities 
adopted the programme more or less in name only, and it was not 
until 2001 that there was a real breakthrough in the expansion of 
coverage (Tang, 2003/4). The number of dibao recipients increased 
from 4 million in 2000 to 22.5 million people in 2003. This increase 
correlated with the central government’s decision to subsidize 
local governments’ dibao expenditure. In 2003, the central 
government’s share of dibao expenditure reached 61.3% (World 
Bank, 2009). The number of recipients has more or less remained 
around 22 million since 2003, amounting to about 6% of the urban 
population.  
Since the dibao benefit line is calculated in accordance with 
local socio-economic conditions, it varies dramatically between 
regions. The highest poverty lines are to be found in coastal 
regions and the lowest in the western and central provinces. In 
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2010, the dibao income line spanned from 156 to 450 RMB (US$25 
to $73) per month, with Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and Shenzhen 
at the top and Urumqi and Xining at the bottom. Qingdao’s dibao 
line was set at RMB 350 (US$57) per month (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 2010).  
Several problems with the implementation of dibao have 
been raised over the last few years. Athar Hussain (2003b) points 
out that dibao is too minimal in its coverage to function as the only 
safety net of last resort. Similarly, Wang Ya Ping (2004) and Guan 
Xinping (2003) note that dibao only covers the most basic living 
costs, such as food and clothing, and that the programme is unable 
to lift people out of poverty. Due to low local capacity, local 
governments have tightened the qualification criteria for receiving 
dibao (Hussain, 2003a). Furthermore, there have been different 
understandings of eligibility criteria by local governments, street 
offices, and local cadres. There has been a tendency to apply the 
narrowest understanding of the concept (Tang, 2003/4). Some 
places have excluded all people of working age, regardless of their 
financial situation. In direct contradiction of central policy, Cho 
Min Young (2010) finds that local officials in Harbin still mainly 
use inability to work as the criterion for eligibility, not income. As 
a result, many eligible poor are not covered. Wuhan and other 
cities have set up other additional criteria of exclusion from the 
programme (Solinger, 2011). Peter Saunders and Xiaoyuan Shang 
(2001) note other problems, including the lack of coordination 
between dibao and other social security programmes. These 
problems are partly due to dibao emerging as a compromise 
between different actors at different state levels (Hammond, 2011). 
While there are now several good studies analysing the 
shortcomings in the practical implementation of dibao and how 
local authorities undermine the State Council’s directives in 
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practice, very little has been said on central-local differences in the 
programme’s legal framework.  
 
 
The Chinese Official Documents to be Studied 
The principal focus of this study is on dibao government 
regulations, such as the State Council documents that stipulate the 
form, structure, and purpose which lower government levels are 
expected to adhere to. We also look at local documents from the 
provincial and municipal levels. The local materials will be limited 
to Shandong province and its Qingdao municipality. The 
following list enumerates the main source materials analysed in 
this study, starting with the shorter names that will be used for 
clarity: 
 
1. State Council Circular: State Council Circular Concerning the 
National Establishment of Dibao for Urban Residents, 
National Document (1997) No. 29 (Guowuyuan guanyu zai 
quanguo jianli chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de 
tongzhi, guofa (1997) 29 hao, (1997) 
29,《国国国国国国国国国国国市国国最最最最最最最最国国
知》国国 号( [1997]29 )) (State Council, 1997).  
2. State Council Regulations: Dibao Regulations for Urban 
Residents (Chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang tiaoli, 
国市国国最最最最最最城城) (State Council, 1999).  
3. Shandong Circular: Circular by the People's Government of 
Shandong Province on Accelerating the Establishment and 
Completion of Dibao for Urban Residents in Accordance 
with National Document (1997) No. 29 (Shandong sheng 
renmin zhengfu guanyu guanche guo fa (1997) 29 hao wenjian 
jiakuai jianli he wanshan chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang 
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zhidu de tongzhi, 山山山山国山山国国山山国国 (1997) 
号号号号号国国号号号国市国国最最最最最最最最国国知29 ) 
(Shandong Provincial Government, 1997). 
4. Shandong Measures: Shandong Province Measures for the 
Implementation of “Dibao Regulations for Urban Residents” 
(Shandong sheng shishi “chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang 
tiaoli” banfa, 山山山山山《国市国国最最最最最最城城》办办) 
(Shandong Provincial Government, 2001). 
5. Qingdao Rules: Qingdao Municipal Rules on Dibao for Urban 
Residents (Qingdao shi chengshi jumin zuidi shenguo baozhang 
gongzuo guiding, 青青市国市国国最最最最最最青青青青) 
(Qingdao Municipal Government, 2004). 
 
This crosscut of dibao regulations allows a comparative approach, 
allowing both vertical and horizontal readings that reveal changes 
over time as well as differences between levels of government. The 
analysis demonstrates the degree to which local governments are 
able to subvert the intentions and visions of the centre in their 
implementation of the programme.  
Legally, the 1997 State Council Circular is no longer relevant 
since it has been superseded by the 1999 Regulations, but it is 
interesting to review since it reveals a trend in the thinking of the 
State Council as well as in the relationship between local and 
central governments. In fact neither the Circular nor the Regulations 
is strictly legally binding, but regulations are the last step by the 
State Council before being given the status of actual law (Thelle, 
2004). Both types of documents show the will of the central 
government, and therefore they are generally heeded by lower 
levels of the administration.  
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Critique of the State Council Circular 
The State Council signalled its official endorsement of the local 
dibao schemes with the Circular in 1997. The Circular set out the 
main governing principles for dibao and establishes a timetable for 
the rollout of the programme on a national scale. It is stipulated 
that by the end of 1997, all cities should have completed the 
preparatory work; by the end of 1998, all local cities should have 
implemented dibao; and by the end of 1999, dibao should be 
implemented in all urban areas at village level or above. Two 
aspects of the Circular are worth considering more detail: eligibility 
and the role of local governments. The document specifies that all 
registered urban residents are eligible to receive dibao payments, 
but three groups are singled out for special attention: 
 
1. Residents with no source of income, without working 
ability, legal providers, or carers.  
2. Residents on unemployment funds or whose 
unemployment funds have run out, but still have not 
found work again, and whose average family income 
is below the minimum living standard line. 
3. Employed or laid-off residents as well as pensioners 
who after receiving the minimum wage or basic 
living allowance or pensions still have average 
household incomes below the minimum living 
standard line (State Council, 1997) 
 
These three groups are considered particularly deserving, so the 
phrasing might seem to indicate that other groups, such as private 
entrepreneurs, are to receive a lesser degree of attention. The three 
groups emphasized are the traditional “three no’s” in category one 
and current or former work unit employees in categories two and 
Central Government Poverty Policy and Local Deviation 
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three. This focus indicates that dibao was principally seen as a 
measure to fill the welfare gap that had appeared as the work unit 
system of social welfare was being dismantled.  
The Circular further stipulates that local governments are 
responsible for implementing and financing dibao and they should 
cooperate with various departments—personnel, statistics, and 
labour in the implementation, screening, logistics, and financing of 
dibao. They should put dibao payments into their regular budgets. 
The threshold and benefit levels are determined by local 
governments according to local price levels and fiscal capacity.  
 
Every locality must practically and realistically set a 
protection standard that both conforms to the 
principles of basic living and is beneficial to 
overcoming a dependency mentality in accordance 
with the costs of basic living necessities and financial 
capacity (State Council, 1997). 
 
The reference to local fiscal capacity allows a great degree of 
autonomy in determining benefit levels. The concept of living 
necessities is very vague. This allows for a wide degree of 
interpretation and is practically a carte blanche for local 
governments to set benefit lines as they wish. Athar Hussain 
argues (2003a) that the wide variations in local poverty lines are 
primarily due to varying local fiscal capacity, not differences in 
local price levels. 
Various other criteria are specified in the Circular as well. 
Eligibility should be calculated according to the applicants’ 
average household income, and payments should only make up 
for the difference up to the local dibao threshold. Other parties are 
also called upon to assist the poor. There is an appeal to traditional 
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values, such as the young helping the elderly and family members 
supporting each other. The Circular is a preliminary step in 
implementing a more comprehensive welfare system, and at the 
same time it represents a clear break from other social welfare 
reforms, particularly since it establishes a non- contributory 
scheme. All in all, local governments are called upon to carry the 
burdens of cost and implementation, but in return, they get a high 
degree of autonomy and control over details. 
 
 
Analysis of the State Council Regulations 
The dibao programme was defined more stringently by the State 
Council on 28 September 1999 with the promulgation of the Dibao 
Regulations for Urban Residents. This document stipulates the form, 
content, and procedures of dibao going into effect from 1 October 
1999. Overall, it is concerned with the same aspects as the Circular 
from 1997, but it goes into much greater detail and consequently it 
is about twice as long. It expands programme coverage and 
restricts the autonomy of local governments considerably 
compared to the 1997 Circular. The text consists of 17 main articles 
which describe various details of implementation.  
As in the Circular, the Regulations stresses that dibao shall 
secure a minimum living standard for its urban residents. Notably, 
it becomes a “right” (quanli, 权权) to receive dibao for urban 
households under the living standard line already in article two. 
The upgrading of dibao to a civil right is a significant qualitative 
change compared to its unclear status in the 1997 Circular. Urban 
citizens can now legally apply for dibao benefits. This empowers 
citizens and is clearly intended to reduce the power of local 
governments. The Regulations also removes references to the three 
groups that were singled out for special attention in the Circular. In 
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many cases, local cadres were limiting dibao benefits to the “three 
no’s” group that earlier constituted the bulk of social welfare 
recipients (Tang, 2003/4). By no longer highlighting specific 
categories of poverty, the new regulations are targeting more 
broadly.  
Household income is specified more precisely as the 
household’s total income and income in kind, including general 
support, child support, alimony payments, etc. The Regulations no 
longer refers to traditional Chinese virtues, but there is still a 
reliance on household members to take care of each other as 
contributions from legal carers, foster parents, and others are 
factored into household income (art. 2). The only excluded income 
is special care to disabled servicemen and the special pensions for 
family of revolutionary martyrs. These groups are privileged for 
political reasons.  
The Regulations sets far more stringent standards in 
determining benefit lines than the Circular. Local governments 
shall set the local dibao line together with city government 
departments for finance, statistics and commodity prices. Article 6 
says: 
 
The dibao standard should be set according to local 
costs of food, clothing, and housing necessary to 
maintain a basic urban living. It should take into 
consideration costs for water, electricity, coal (gas) as 
well as compulsory education fees for minors (State 
Council, 1999). 
 
A significant difference is the removal of the reference to local 
fiscal capacity. Together with the detailed specification of how the 
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dibao line should be calculated, the changes here give local 
governments less freedom to set the benefit line as they please.  
Application procedures are changed as well. It is specified 
that dibao applicants should receive a response in writing within 
30 days of their application, and they have a right to appeal if their 
application is rejected (art. 8). Rejections should be submitted in 
writing with an explanation of why the applicant did not qualify. 
The requirement that rejections should be justified in a timely 
manner and subject to review puts greater pressure on denying 
instances. This again upgrades the rights of applicants vis-à-vis 
local governments.  
It is stipulated that the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing 
holds the overall responsibility for dibao (art. 4), while local 
governments are responsible for the practical implementation. 
This is much like in the Circular, but duties and responsibilities of 
the different departments are clarified. Local governments above 
county level are responsible for the implementation and 
administration of dibao. Neighbourhood committees and local 
township governments are responsible for the supervision, 
approval, and examination of dibao applicants. Local governments 
are still responsible for covering the financial costs of dibao, but 
they are now mandated to set up special funds earmarked for the 
programme in their regular budgets (art. 5). In addition, 
government should encourage organizations and private persons 
to contribute financially (art. 6).  
There are new sections on code of conduct and application 
procedures in the Regulations. Dibao workers must satisfy a 
number of requirements and there is a list of punishable offences, 
including graft, favouritism, and misappropriation of funds (art. 
13). Local governments are responsible for ensuring that dibao 
workers live up to these criteria and implement the programme 
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properly. Other changes in the Regulations add to the burden of 
applicants and beneficiaries. Eligibility checks are specified in 
some detail and make application cumbersome and unpleasant for 
the applicant (art. 7): 
 
In order to examine the need for dibao remuneration, 
the office in charge of examination and approval can 
verify and check the economic conditions and actual 
living standard of applicant households through 
household investigations, interviews with neighbours, 
written testimonies, etc. The applicant as well as 
relevant units, organizations and individuals must 
accept this investigation and should disclose relevant 
circumstances truthfully (State Council, 1999). 
 
A full list of the names of all successful applicants should be made 
public so the public can make complaints about faults, hidden 
incomes, etc. (art. 9).  
 
For urban residents who have already been approved 
to receive dibao benefits, the administrative approval 
authority should adopt the appropriate form for public 
announcement about the household in order to receive 
the supervision of the masses. Any person can raise 
objections to the administrative approval authority 
about dibao recipients who do not fulfil the legal 
conditions (State Council, 1999). 
 
It appears that the application procedure is designed to be a 
humiliating public spectacle. This is in order to increase the 
transparency of the programme, but it also has the effect that the 
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recipients’ degree of economic helplessness is made known 
throughout the local community. These government procedures 
are supposedly in place to ensure that nobody receives dibao 
without being truly without other means of income, but they also 
seem to be deliberately stigmatizing.  
Overall, the Regulations document has the effect of 
standardizing the programme and giving applicants more rights 
vis-à-vis local governments. There is an emphasis on procedural 
expansion and standardization, and this fits well with the central 
government’s proclaimed intentions for greater social welfare 
coverage and the unspoken attempt at strengthening its control 
over the local authorities. Compared with the Circular, the 
Regulations represent a shift in the State Council’s approach as 
access to dibao becomes a right, and applicants gain recourse to 
complaint procedures, notification in writing, etc. Similarly, by 
removing the Circular’s focus on a few select groups, coverage is 
expanded to include all urban residents below the local poverty 
line. In addition, the determination of the dibao poverty line is 
specified in greater detail and no longer refers to local state 
capacity. The demand for the inclusion of dibao expenditure in 
local budgets means that local governments no longer have the 
right to prioritize other expenses and claim that the remaining 
funds are insufficient to finance welfare programmes. It seems 
clear that one of the primary concerns of the State Council has 
been to limit the autonomy of local governments in implementing 
dibao.  
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Policy Implementations in Shandong Province and 
Qingdao Municipality 
The implementations of the dibao programme at local levels have 
taken various forms and shapes, but invariably the legislation 
echoes the shape and form of the State Council documents. In the 
following, local documents from Shandong are studied with 
examples from two different levels: the Shandong provincial 
government and Qingdao municipality. 
At the Shandong provincial level, the legal documents on the 
dibao programme have followed the lead of the State Council 
fairly closely. The Shandong Province Circular on the 
implementation of the State Council Circular was issued on 11 
November 1997, two months after the State Council document 
(Shandong Provincial Government, 1997). Like the State Council 
Circular, the Shandong Circular is not legally binding. Since the 
wording is largely copied verbatim from the State Council 
document, the document is little more than a declaration of 
support.  
In the first article, the Shandong Circular specifies that dibao 
in the province should be implemented according to the State 
Council Circular and the spirit of the 15th Party Congress. The only 
changes are the specification of a range for dibao benefits and the 
setting of an earlier deadline for implementation at all sub-
provincial levels. The deadline for full implementation is moved 
forward to the first quarter of 1998, much earlier than the State 
Council deadline set at the end of 1999. It is specified that the 
monthly benefit level should be set between 100 and 140 RMB 
(US$16 and $23) according to local prices and local fiscal capacity 
(art. 3). Apart from the specification of a monetary range, the 
reasoning and wording are copied directly from the State Council 
document.  
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In 2001, the Shandong Measures was promulgated by the 
Shandong government (Shandong Provincial Government, 2001). 
In the first article, it states that its purpose is to standardize dibao 
in the province in accordance with the State Council’s Regulations 
from 1999. At 21 articles, the Shandong Measures is considerably 
longer than the Regulations or the Shandong Circular which only 
had 7 articles.  
On the whole, the Shandong Measures is a rehash of the State 
Council Regulations with a number of elaborations to clarify 
difficult cases. For example, it is specified that if household 
incomes are irregular, an average of the past three months should 
be used (art. 3). The calculation of household income is specified in 
considerably greater detail, with a list of what is included (art. 4) 
and excluded (art. 5) from household income. Compared to the 
Regulations, aid to poor students and certain social security 
payments to civil servants are excluded from income calculations, 
so those groups are better off here. Unlike the Shandong Circular, 
there is no longer a specification of a dibao benefit range. Instead, 
the calculation should reflect local prices of food, clothing, etc. (art. 
7).  
More interestingly, the Shandong Measures differs from the 
Regulations by paying no attention to regulating the conduct of 
dibao workers. The entire section is omitted. This perhaps 
indicates that the provincial government is less concerned with the 
rights of applicants and misappropriation of funds. The timing of 
the document’s promulgation is also worthy of note. Where the 
first provincial circular followed the 1997 State Council Circular 
within a few months, the Shandong Measures did not arrive until 
October 2001—a full two years after the State Council Regulations 
from 1999. It is tempting to interpret this delay as a sign of 
disaffection with increasing central state control over the 
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programme. The timing of the Shandong Measures coincides with 
the central government increasing its share of dibao financing. It 
seems that this change prompted the Shandong provincial 
government to implement the dibao programme more vigorously 
and support its implementation by issuing the Shandong Measures.  
Eligibility was somewhat restricted in June 2004 when the 
provincial government issued a new document which further 
specifies the working of dibao within the province, Shandong 
Province Guidelines for Dibao Work  (Shandong sheng chengshi jumin 
zuidi shenghuo baozhang gongzuo guifan 山山山国市国国最最最最 
最最青青青保) (Shandong Provincial Government, 2004). This 
document raises eligibility criteria in various ways. In straight 
contradiction with the State Council legislation, a number of 
groups are listed as ineligible to receive dibao payments (art. 8) 
including those who have recently moved to homes with an area 
exceeding 30 percent of the local average, those who have recently 
bought computers, cameras, pianos or other expensive goods, 
people who speak too much on mobile phones, incorrigible 
gamblers, drug addicts, etc. In other articles, various conditions for 
screening applicants are listed.  
By comparison, there tends to be greater flexibility at the 
municipal level. Since 1994, several Qingdao municipal-level 
documents have been issued on the implementation of dibao, but 
in the following we will only look at the most recent one from 2004, 
the Qingdao Rules (Qingdao Municipal Government, 2004). In this 
document, the procedures of dibao are defined in greater detail. It 
is by far the longest of all the official documents, containing 53 
articles divided into 9 chapters.  
The Qingdao Rules text departs significantly from the national 
and provincial documents on dibao, despite proclaiming from the 
beginning to be in line with the State Council’s 1999 Regulations as 
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well as Shandong’s 2002 Measures. One difference is that the 
Qingdao Rules regulate responsibilities at the four sub-municipal 
levels: municipality (shi 市), district (qu 区), street (jiedao 街街), and 
neighbourhood street committee (shequ juweihui 社区国社社). The 
document sets various responsibilities for each level and how 
various organs should cooperate with regard to statistics, 
financing, etc.  
The first significant difference between Qingdao and the 
State Council’s Regulations relates to the status of applicants. As 
mentioned earlier, it is specified in the Regulations that all qualified 
people should get dibao as a “right”. That word is altered in the 
Qingdao Rules, showing that municipal authorities sometimes have 
a different perspective on the matter. Quoting the two articles side 
by side shows the differences most clearly: 
 
Article Two. For urban residents with non-rural 
residence permits, all family members living together 
with an average income below the local dibao line all 
have the right to receive material assistance for basic 
living from local governments (State Council, 1999). 
 
Article Two. For residents of this city with non-rural 
residence permits, all family members living together 
with an average monthly income below the city’s dibao 
line can apply for dibao aid (Qingdao Municipal 
Government, 2004). 
 
The two articles are clearly similar, but the changes in wording 
shift the emphasis considerably. A right to receive dibao is 
downgraded to a mere option to apply.  
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Another considerable difference with the Regulations is in the 
assessment procedures of applicant eligibility. This is given 
particular attention in the Qingdao Rules with the establishment of 
a new government body, the “Dibao Assessment Group” (chengshi 
dibao pinggu xiaozu国市最最城城城城), which is tasked with 
ensuring that eligibility criteria are thoroughly researched and 
examined (art. 11). After being screened by the neighbourhood 
committee, applicants are required to go to “Democratic 
Community Proceedings” (shequ minzhu yishi hui社区国社社社社) 
to present their cases there as well. The order of these meetings is 
specified in great detail: 
 
The normal agenda for discussing dibao applications at 
the Democratic Community Proceedings is as follows: 
(1) The applicant reads aloud the application form; 
(2) The Dibao Assessment Group presents the results of 
its assessment; 
(3) Members at the meeting interrogate the applicant; 
(4) The applicant answers the questions; 
(5) The applicant withdraws; 
(6) There is a vote by views on the assessment study 
(Qingdao Municipal Government, 2004). 
 
These proceedings all add to the stigmatization and burden of the 
applicant. The public performance and examination before a panel 
makes application stressful and generally unpleasant. The 
screening by the Assessment Group adds additional barriers to 
successful application to the programme. Regardless of the 
outcome of the application, the results of the inquiry are to be 
made public. This, similarly, is described in greater detail than in 
any of the preceding legal documents. Once dibao is granted, 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.14 
20 
 
recipient households are divided into three categories, A, B, and C, 
(art. 35) and put into job-seeking services, community service, and 
other programmes according to each category. This classification 
does not figure in any of the other documents analysed here.  
Taken as a whole, it seems that the aim of the document is to 
restrict dibao as much as possible without straying too far from the 
rules imposed by the State Council Regulation. The burdens of 
proof of eligibility are raised considerably. These changes 
demonstrate that Qingdao municipality is much less eager to push 
for the expansion of dibao coverage than the central government 
wishes. In a similar vein, there is little mention of dibao workers’ 
wrongdoings. This follows the Shandong Measures. 
The Qingdao Rules also shows the degree to which the 
municipal level can assert control over the implementation of 
dibao. Qingdao’s municipal document is far more assertive than 
the Shandong provincial documents which seem to have little 
purpose other than reiterating the ordinances of the State Council. 
The municipal dibao regulations are far more detailed, listing 
groups of applicants, income calculations, exceptions, 
requirements, etc. The timing of the document is also remarkable. 
Much like the Shandong Measures followed two years after the 
1999 State Council Regulation, Qingdao’s own dibao document is 
much delayed. Promulgated in August 2004, it follows nearly 
three years after the provincial measures.  
While such documents cannot be used to gauge the 
intricacies of relative power between levels of government 
bureaucracy, they do show that the State Council and the 
municipal government are the most influential in determining the 
shape and form of dibao. Provincial governments have relatively 
little influence since the major details of implementation are all 
decided at lower administrative levels. With the Regulation, the 
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State Council took a big step to promote an expansion and 
standardization of the programme, but on balance, it is still clearly 
the local governments which have the greatest degree of control.  
The documents analysed here also reveal a divide between 
the intentions of the central government and municipalities such 
as Qingdao. The State Council is pushing for greater coverage and 
generally expands the rights of applicants at the expense of local 
authorities. From the 1997 Circular to the 1999 Regulation, the State 
Council broadens eligibility criteria and applicants’ rights 
considerably. This is in tune with its overall intentions to expand 
social welfare coverage. At the other end of the spectrum, local 
governments are concerned with the rising welfare expenses, and 
they generally push in the opposite direction, restricting the rights 
of applicants and imposing additional burdens of qualification 
before dibao can be received.  
Qingdao is a large coastal municipality and relatively 
wealthy. This allows it to assert a greater degree of independence. 
Smaller cities are generally less specific in their regulations and 
tend to rely more closely on the regulations issued by higher levels 
of government. For example, Rizhao 日日, also in Shandong, has 
no specific urban dibao regulations of its own. The local 
government put out a document supporting the Shandong Province 
Guidelines for Dibao Work (Rizhao Municipal Government, 2005), 
but there is little else specific to urban dibao. This perhaps 
indicates that less personnel and effort has been put into dibao 
work in such places. It can also be seen as reflecting that smaller 
municipalities and townships make less of an effort to distinguish 
their implementations from the rules of higher government levels. 
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Conclusion 
Many studies have found dibao to be an ineffective social welfare 
net, both in terms of coverage and actual payments. As 
demonstrated here, this local discrepancy is mirrored in local 
programme regulations as well. An ongoing dialogue or sparring 
between the State Council and local governments has evolved as a 
result. The State Council and the Ministry of Civil Affairs have 
responded by issuing various statements and resolutions with 
exhortations that local governments should implement the 
programme more comprehensively (State Council, 2000; Ministry 
of Civil Affairs, 2001). Such notices demonstrate the central 
government’s resolve to promote a wider implementation of dibao. 
All local districts and governments are exhorted to increase the 
number of recipients and promote reemployment, ensure that 
eligible people get dibao regardless of background, set up 
earmarked funds, increase dibao funding, standardize the way 
dibao funds are channelled to recipients, ensure that payments are 
transferred in a timely fashion, strengthen the supervision of the 
programme, etc.  
The State Council in Beijing fully understands that dibao has 
not been fully implemented nationwide, and that it has been held 
back by the local authorities due to economic and political 
constraints. Besides such official notices, there have been 
exhortations promoting the ideal of “fully covering everybody in 
need” (yingbao jinbao应最应最) (Renmin Ribao, 18 September 2001). 
These notices serve as a public appeal on behalf of the destitute, 
demonstrating the central government’s concern for the poor. Of 
course they also highlight the problematic relationship between 
centre and periphery in implementing the grand vision of 
universal coverage. 
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Dibao has emerged as a compromise between the interests of 
central and local government levels (Guan and Xu, 2011). Behind 
this compromise lies a gap between the central government’s 
welfare intentions and the current implementation of the 
programme at the grassroots level. While the central government 
might wish for a more comprehensive social safety net to cover the 
increasing numbers of uninsured poor, it is constrained by the 
priorities and fiscal capacities of the provincial and municipal 
governments.  
Dibao was originally a local initiative and it remains largely 
in the hands of local governments. As this study demonstrates, 
such differences are mirrored in policy legislation. Governments at 
municipal levels are able to interpret and reformulate central dibao 
provisions in a highly flexible manner. As a result, policy 
documents from different levels seem to enter a sort of dialogue by 
copying selectively, adding new sections, and altering the 
language. Welfare policies in China reflect the complex interplay 
between local and central policy interests, and while no single 
policy text reveals such tensions, a horizontal and vertical reading 
can provide new insights into these dynamics.  
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Appendices: Dibao Household in Kashgar, Xinjiang  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Photographs taken by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Summer 2006. 
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— R. G. Tiedemann, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, UK 
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